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1295 
INK BLOT OR NOT:  THE MEANING OF PRIVILEGES AND/OR 
IMMUNITIES 
Richard L. Aynes* 
“I admit, you have a clear right to show it is wrong if you can; but you have 
no right to pretend you can not see it at all.”1  Abraham Lincoln 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:  “No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States.”2  An examination of the Jour-
nal of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction reveals that the addi-
tion of the terms “privileges or immunities” was the work of 
Pennsylvania native and Ohio Congressman John A. Bingham, whom 
Justice Black called the ”Madison of the first section of the Four-
teenth Amendment.”3  Benjamin Kendrick, the editor of the pub-
lished Journal, wrote that “had it not been for [Bingham’s] untiring 
efforts the provision for nationalizing civil rights would have not 
found a place in the fourteenth amendment.”4 
This Article will explore the following topics:  (1) the use of the 
terms privileges and immunities in America; (2) evidence that privi-
leges and immunities were intended to protect the rights of citizens; 
 
 * John F. Seiberling Chair of Constitutional Law and Director of the Constitutional Law 
Center, University of Akron, School of Law.  The Constitutional Law Center was one of 
four established by the U.S. Congress  in order to commemorate the Bi-Centennial of the 
U.S. Constitution in 1987.  For more information, see http://www.uakron.edu/law/
cclaw.php.  Comments and suggestions can be sent to raynes@uakron.edu. 
   A prior version of this paper was presented at the “Second Founding” Conference on 
November 14th, 2008, which was held at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law 
and co-sponsored by the American Constitution Society for Law and Policy and the Con-
stitutional Accountability Center. 
 1 Abraham Lincoln, Speech in the U.S. House of Representatives on the Presidential Ques-
tion (July 27, 1848), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, LINCOLN:  SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832–1858, 
at 205, 207 (Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed., 1989) [hereinafter LINCOLN]. 
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 3 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).  For biographical 
information on Congressman Bingham, see Richard L. Aynes, The Continuing Importance of 
Congressman John A. Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 589 (2003); 
Richard L. Aynes, The Antislavery and Abolitionist Background of John A. Bingham, 37 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 881 (1988).  See also Richard L. Aynes, John A. Bingham, in 2 AMERICAN 
NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 792–93 (John A. Garraty & Mark C. Carnes eds.,1999). 
 4 BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON 
RECONSTRUCTION 184 (1914). 
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(3) the breadth of the rights protected under the privileges or im-
munities clause; (4) the consensus on the enforcement of the Bill of 
Rights against the States; and (5) how the task of determining the 
privileges and/or immunities of U.S. citizens should be executed.  
Though a comprehensive discussion of all of the privileges or immu-
nities is beyond the scope of this work, consideration will be given to 
how these principles would apply to two matters protected by the Bill 
of Rights, the Establishment Clause, and the Second Amendment, to 
illustrate the application of the principles involved.  Further illustra-
tions will be provided by consideration of a right noted in the Consti-
tution, but not contained in the Bill of Rights:  the writ of habeas 
corpus, and the potential application to a right of family life, which 
now seems to be at least partially protected by the concept of substan-
tive due process. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF THE USE OF THE WORDS “PRIVILEGES OR 
IMMUNITIES” 
The phrase “privilege or immunities” used in the Fourteenth 
Amendment was not created by Bingham.  Rather, the terminology 
had a long and respected independent history in America.5  For ex-
ample, the first Charter of Virginia (April 10, 1606) used similar ter-
minology by indicating that the colonists “shall HAVE and enjoy all 
Liberties, Franchises, and Immunities” that they would have if they 
were born in and were residing in England.6  By 1612, when Virginia’s 
Third Charter was issued, the language had evolved to include both 
terms:  “Liberties, Franchises, Privileges, Immunities, Benefits, Profits, 
 
 5 For purposes of this article the use of these terms in America is all that is necessary.  
However, it is clear the origin of these terms can be traced to earlier times in England.  
See generally Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death:  The 
Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1094–96 (2000) 
(discussing English and colonial history, including an analysis of Blackstone). 
 6 The First Charter of Virginia (1606), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 39, 44 (Rich-
ard L. Perry ed., 1978) (emphasis added) [hereinafter SOURCES].  See also The Charter of 
Maryland, art. XVI (1632), reprinted in SOURCES supra, at 105, 111 (“Rights, Jurisdictions, 
Liberties, and Privileges . . . .”); Massachusetts Body of Liberties, pmbl. (1641) 
(“[L]iberties Immunities and priveledges [sic] . . . .”), reprinted in SOURCES supra, at 148; 
The Charter of Massachusetts Bay (1629), reprinted in SOURCES supra, at 82, 93 
(“[L]iberties and Immunities . . . .”); Pennsylvania Charter of Privileges (1701) (“Liber-
ties, Franchises and Privileges . . . .”), reprinted in SOURCES supra, at 255–56; Concessions 
and Agreements of West New Jersey (1677) (“[T]he common law or fundamental rights 
and privileges . . . .”), reprinted in SOURCES supra, at 184.  For further discussion of early 
examples from Virginia, Massachusetts and Georgia, see MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO 
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE:  THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 64–65 
(1986). 
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and Commodities whatsoever” of the prior colonists were guaranteed 
to new colonists.7  Thus, these terms were part of the usage and cul-
ture of people in America for at least 250 years prior to their use in 
the proposed Fourteenth Amendment.  Further, these terms were 
used in the Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Con-
gress in 1774, almost a century before they were proposed as part of 
Section 1.  The Continental Congress maintained that Americans 
were “entitled to all the immunities and privileges granted” in royal 
charters or provincial laws.8 
These same words were, of course, used in the Article IV of the 
Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union.9  They also were in-
cluded in the original Constitution in Article IV, Section 2, which 
provides:  “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges 
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”10 
These words did not disappear after the adoption of the Constitu-
tion.  Rather, they were preserved in the general lexicon, as evi-
denced by the state constitution of Ohio, where Bingham was admit-
ted to the bar.  The Ohio Constitution of 1851 used both terms:  “no 
special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted, that may not be 
altered, revoked, or repealed by the General Assembly.”11 
As Professor William J. Rich has documented, these terms were al-
so used in contracts, corporate charters, and other legal documents 
throughout the nineteenth century.12  Privileges and immunities were 
 
 7 SOURCES, supra note 6, at 44 n.26 (emphasis added). 
 8 Id. at 288.  See also id. at 287 (noting that “our ancestors . . . were . . . entitled to all the 
rights, liberties, and immunities of free and natural-born subjects”). 
 9 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION, art. IV, § 1 (“The better to se-
cure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the differ-
ent States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and 
fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in 
the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and 
from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, 
subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions, as the inhabitants thereof respec-
tively; provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of 
property imported into any State, to any other State, of which the owner is an inhabitant; 
provided also, that no imposition, duties, or restriction, shall be laid by any State on the 
property of the United States, or either of them.” (emphasis added)). 
 10 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 11 OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. I, §2 (emphasis added). 
 12 See William J. Rich, Privileges or Immunities:  The Missing Link in Establishing Congressional 
Power to Abrogate State Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235, 246–47 
(2001) (noting that the terms appeared in contracts as boiler-plate and in incorporation 
certificates as well). 
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common terms that were used in a variety of U.S. treaties not only in 
the nineteenth century but up to the present day.13 
Moreover, these were not simply lawyers’ terms.  In an era in 
which people subscribed to the Congressional Globe and read the de-
bates, where individuals attended trial proceedings, when court opin-
ions were published—often in full—in the newspapers, these terms 
were part of the public understanding of the era.14  As Michael Kent 
Curtis has noted:  “The words rights, liberties, privileges and immunities, 
seem to have been used interchangeably.”15 
Indeed, one has to look no further than the Slaughter-House Cases16 
to see that Professor Curtis’s conclusion is supported by then con-
temporaneous views.  In the majority opinion Justice Miller  referred 
to the privileges or immunities clause as protecting the “right” of U.S. 
citizens on multiple occasions.  For example, after discussion of Jus-
tice Washington’s opinion in Corfield v. Coryell,17 Justice Miller summa-
rized Washington’s view as being that the privilege or immunities are 
 
 13 For example, the Burlingame Treaty between the United States and China provided that:  
“Chinese subjects visiting or residing in the United States, shall enjoy the same privileges, 
immunities, and exemptions in respect to travel or residence, as may there be enjoyed by 
the . . . most favored nation.”  Additional Articles to the Treaty Between the United States 
and China, U.S.-P.R.C., art. VI, June 18, 1858, 16 Stat. 739, 740.  These words, privileges 
and immunities, were often qualified by adding the words “the same” or comparisons to 
“the most favored” nation so that this became an equality provision.  But the terms privi-
leges and immunities themselves were not limited to equality.  The use of these terms in 
treaties was common and continues today.  See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions art. XXXVI, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (using the term “same”).  
As is true in domestic law, in international treaties “privileges and immunities are nothing 
but ‘rights,’ in the broader sense of the term.”  Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by 
Multinational Corporations and International Law:  Where from Here?, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 
53 (2003).  For other examples of the use of these terms in treaties, see AKHIL R. AMAR, 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 167 n.* (1998). 
 14 For a summary of the importance of reprinting speeches in this era for mass distribution, 
see Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE 
L.J. 57, 69 n.66 (1993). 
 15 CURTIS, supra note 6 at 64–65 (second emphasis added).  Black’s Law Dictionary does dis-
tinguish between privilege and immunity, indicating that an immunity is an 
“[e]xemption” while a privilege is a “particular and peculiar benefit or advantage.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 885, 1359 (4th ed. 1968).  Yet, that same source demonstrates 
the overlap between the two terms in its definitions of privilege which includes:  “A right, 
power, franchise, or immunity held by a person or class” and “[a]n exemption from some 
burden or attendance.”  Id. at 1359 (emphasis added).  Likewise, THE NEW ROGET’S 
THESAURUS 376–77 (1964) lists among the synonyms for “privilege” the words “right” and 
“immune.”  This is not to deny that earlier in history the various terms may have had very 
distinct meaning.  But just as the probate words “devise, bequeath, and bequest” no long-
er convey the distinction they once had, by 1866 the words privileges, immunities, and 
rights were no longer used in distinct ways. 
 16 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
 17 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). 
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“those rights which are fundamental.”18  In suggesting some privileges 
and immunities which “owe their existence to the Federal govern-
ment,” Justice Miller included the “right” of travel found in Crandall 
v. Nevada;19 “the right of free access to its seaports”;20 the right to de-
mand care and protections of one’s life, liberty and property on the 
high seas or in a foreign jurisdiction;21 the privilege of the writ of ha-
beas corpus as one of the “rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Fed-
eral Constitution”;22 the “right to use the navigable waters of the Unit-
ed States”;23 “all rights secured to our citizens by treaties”;24 the 
opportunity to become a citizen of a state with “the same rights as 
other citizens of that State”;25 and the “rights secured by the thirteenth 
and fifteenth articles of amendment, and by the other clause of the 
fourteenth.”26  No other Justice questioned Justice Miller’s language 
in equating “rights” with “privileges or immunities.” 
The link between the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause 
and the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities clause is 
not accidental.  As early as 1856, Congressman and Section 1 author 
John A. Bingham stated on the floor of the House of Representatives 
that Article IV, Section 2 contained an ellipsis that made it clear the 
clause should read:  “The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
privileges and immunities of citizens [of the United States] in the 
several States.”27  An examination of the text lends reasonable support 
to this view, because the first reference to citizens is clearly limited to 
state citizenship, but the second reference contains no such limita-
tion.28 
Bingham, consistent with long-standing anti-slavery theory, con-
trasted Congress’s enforcement power under the Full Faith and Cre-
dit Clause29 with the lack of explicit enforcement power under the 
 
 18 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 76 (emphasis added). 
 19 Id. at 79. 
 20 Id. (emphasis added). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. (emphasis added). 
 23 Id. (emphasis added). 
 24 Id. (emphasis added). 
 25 Id. at 80 (emphasis added). 
 26 Id. at 80 (emphasis added).  Further, though he did not refer specifically to the First 
Amendment, Miller wrote:  “The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of 
grievances . . . are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.”  Id. at 79 
(emphasis added). 
 27 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859). 
 28 The text supports Bingham’s view.  At the same time, there is some ambiguity and it is not 
the only possible reading. 
 29 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in 
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”). 
1300 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:5 
 
remaining portions of Article IV and reasoned that the Fugitive Slave 
Act (and the other clauses)30 could not be enforced by the federal 
government.31  With this context, it is understandable that the Con-
gress thought it was clarifying Article IV when it adopted the Four-
teenth Amendment by spelling out the rights of U.S. citizens, includ-
ing their privileges or immunities.32  Further, this explains statements 
on the floor of Congress that the Amendment was designed to pro-
vide enforcement power.33 
It is true that some individuals have an idiosyncratic view of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Most famously, Judge Robert Bork of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, who, having aided Presi-
dent Richard Nixon in the “Saturday night massacre” by discharging 
Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, attempted to “nullify” the Four-
teenth Amendment by characterizing the provision as an “ink blot.”34  
Of course, if this were true, then over 250 years of English and Amer-
ican legal history would be an “ink blot.”  It is more likely that Judge 
Bork is wrong35 than it is that thousands of lawyers and laymen had 
 
 30 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (“No Person held to Service or Labour in one 
State . . . shall, in Consequence of any Law . . . be discharged from such Service . . . .”). 
 31 See Aynes, supra note 14, at 62 (explaining the anti-slavery textual analysis led to the ar-
gument that Article IV, except for the Full Faith and Credit Clause, was unenforceable). 
 32 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 33 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
 34 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 166 
(1990).  Judge Bork apparently did not work very hard in his attempt to discover its 
meaning.  It took me one book and about fifteen minutes to trace the meaning and his-
tory back to 1606 and even less time to document the link between “rights” and “privi-
leges or immunities” in Justice Miller’s opinion.  Of course, even Justice Miller, Justice 
Jackson, and the Court in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) were able to see more than 
Judge Bork’s “ink blot.” 
 35 There are two other observations that apply as well.  There is no indication in any of 
Judge Bork’s work that he canvassed the relative debates of the framing or ratification in 
a serious way as did Justice Black or the many scholars who come to an opposite conclu-
sion.  Further, it appears that Judge Bork committed the first “sin” against legal scholar-
ship:  he did not take the people who proposed and adopted the Amendment seriously. 
See Richard L. Aynes, The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Seven Deadly Sins 
of Legal Scholarship, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 407, 409–18 (2000) (articulating the impor-
tance of taking previous scholars’ work seriously).  Though recognizing this as an “all too 
human trait,” it appears that Judge Bork assumed, when he could not make sense of Sec-
tion 1, that the problem was with the way the section was written and not with himself.  Id. 
at 410.  This is consistent with the view that we “tend to see and hear only those messages 
that are congruent with our interests and attitudes.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting B. EUGENE GRIESSMAN, THE ACHIEVEMENT FACTORS, CANDID INTERVIEWS 
WITH SOME OF THE MOST SUCCESSFUL PEOPLE OF OUR TIME 191 (1993)). 
   Like Charles Fairman, who was one of the great scholars of his era, Judge Bork’s ex-
perience and views may have colored his perceptions so that, like someone who is tone 
deaf or has an impaired sense of taste, he was simply unable to accurately analyze this sit-
 
July 2009] INK BLOT OR NOT 1301 
 
used these terms for almost 250 years without giving them any mean-
ing.36  Indeed, Judge Bork’s comment reminds one of then future 
 
uation.  For a general discussion of how the lens through which one views a problem can 
affect legal conclusions, see PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION:  
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH (1999). 
 36 It is clear that attempts were made by the Democratic minority to obscure the meaning of 
these words and it is common to cite, for example, speeches of Senator Reverdy Johnson 
(D-Md.) for claims about defects in the proposed amendment.  E.g., George C. Thomas 
III, The Riddle of the Fourteenth Amendment:  A Response to Professor Wildenthal, 68 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1627, 1633, 1646 (2007). 
   Of course, it must be noted that Johnson was in a decided minority in the Senate.  He 
was listed as a member of the “Opposition” even when Abraham Lincoln was President.  
Domestic Intelligence, HARPER’S WEEKLY, Jan. 16, 1864, at 35.  At the time he was one of only 
eighteen Senate members in the opposition, id., who were easily out-voted by the thirty-
two members supporting President Lincoln.  He ultimately was one of only three mem-
bers—all Democrats—of the Joint Committee of Fifteen voting in opposition to submit-
ting the Fourteenth Amendment to the Congress.  KENDRICK, supra note 4, at 115.  In the 
vote upon the Fourteenth Amendment he was one of only eleven of the forty-nine mem-
bers of the Senate who voted against the Amendment’s adoption.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 3042 (1866).  It is noteworthy that while five Republicans voted against 
the Amendment, not a single Democratic vote in the Senate was given in favor of its 
adoption. 
   Most lawyers do not have the luxury of choosing their clients or choosing their caus-
es, but Johnson did.  If we look at his choices, we will see that there are reasons to be 
skeptical about anything that Johnson argued on the floor of the Senate with respect to 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which he opposed.  Johnson was counsel in the Dred Scott 
case, not only arguing for slavery, but arguing that liberty could continue only if slavery 
was perpetual.  Of course, because of his role in that case, he knew that Chief Justice Ta-
ney had defined Article IV privileges and immunities to include many of the Bill of Rights 
protections, including the right to bear arms.  In a pre-Fourteenth Amendment case, 
Johnson argued that while the First Amendment’s requirement that there be “no inter-
ference with religion” was not binding on Missouri, that the Amendment “announce[d] a 
great principle of American liberty,” that its violation was “tyrannical,” and it was “almost 
inconceivable” that the state constitution come to a contrary result.  Cummings v. Mis-
souri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 313 (1866).  After the adoption of the Amendment, Johnson 
and his co-counsel admitted that it enforced the Second Amendment against the states.  
ROBERT KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION:  THE FEDERAL 
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 122–32 (1985).  The 
cases were United States v. Avery, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 251 (1871), and United States v. Mitchell, 
26 F. Cas. 1283 (C.C.D.S.C. 1871) (No. 15,790). 
   Johnson was recruited in the Colfax Massacre case by former Confederate General 
Wade Hampton and helped create the Supreme Court’s unjust decision in United States v. 
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).  See CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED:  THE COLFAX 
MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION 116–17 (2008) 
(explaining the history behind Johnson and Hampton’s relationship).  For more on the 
Colfax Massacre, see NICHOLAS LEMANN, REDEMPTION:  THE LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL 
WAR 12–30, 163 (2006).  Johnson merits further study to determine whether or not he 
ever used his talents on the side of liberty or freedom. 
   But if, as is often claimed, Johnson was one of the best lawyers of his era, he was cer-
tainly not one of the best men.  Though the application of the principle to Johnson is my 
responsibility, I am indebted to the analysis in Eric L. Muller, Judging Thomas Ruffin and 
the Hindsight Defense, 87 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), for this concept.  The record of 
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President Lincoln’s points of analysis:  “I admit, you have a clear right 
to show it is wrong if you can; but you have no right to pretend you 
do not see it at all.”37 
Recognizing that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was de-
signed to protect the rights of U.S. citizens, Judge Bork’s statement 
amounts to a claim that he does not know of any rights that belong to 
U.S. citizens.  One might credibly say that the full scope of the rights 
of U.S. citizens is unclear or even contested.  But to deny that one 
knows of any right that one has by virtue of being a U.S. citizen is be-
yond credulity. 
II.  THE CLAUSE WAS INTENDED TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF U.S. 
CITIZENS 
It is appropriate to recognize that the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was thought by the framers 
and the ratifiers to provide substantial and, in some cases, substantive 
protections against the States and to give the federal government the 
power to enforce those provisions.38  This is reasonably apparent from 
the plain reading of the text.39  Further, this conclusion is supported 
by a thorough and systematic review of the debates over the Amend-
ment in Congress.  For those who do not have the time to devote to 
looking at the voluminous records on the proposal and the ratifica-
 
Senator Johnson places him on the wrong side of history and, more importantly, among 
the worst people of his generation.  We know that talent, like bravery, has no inevitable 
moral content.  It can be used for evil as well as good purposes, and Johnson made choic-
es reflecting that his values were inconsistent with the national goals of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 37 Abraham Lincoln, Speech in the U.S. House of Representatives on the Presidential Ques-
tion (July 27, 1848), in LINCOLN, supra note 1, at 207. 
 38 Some scholars have suggested that this clause is simply a non-discrimination provision.  
For an article along these lines, see John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992).  Of course, there is no question that equality is one of 
the privileges or immunities.  However, if it were the only privilege or immunity, then the 
use of both “privilege” and “immunity” would not have been necessary and those terms 
would have been inserted into the Amendment in the singular form not the plural.  Fur-
ther, as Professor Curtis has noted, “this reading . . . does not refer to national constitu-
tional rights at all; it refers to rights under state law. . . .  The denial of rights of speech 
and press and other basic liberties in the South before the Civil war was racially neutral; 
neither whites nor blacks, Southerners or Northerners, could engage in anti-slavery or 
pro-Republican speech.”  Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights and the States:  An Overview 
from One Perspective, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES (forthcoming 2009). 
 39 See Charles R. Pence, The Construction of the Fourteenth Amendment, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 536, 
540 (1891) (“If the language of the fourteenth amendment is to have its natural and ob-
vious meaning . . . it would seem to prohibit the States from making or enforcing any law 
which shall abridge the rights secured [by] . . . the constitution.”). 
July 2009] INK BLOT OR NOT 1303 
 
tion of the Amendment, an examination of the historical appendix 
that Justice Black attached to his dissent in Adamson v. California40 
should give a quick overview of many of the salient points of the de-
bate and demonstrate the predominance of the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause in the thinking of the framers.41 
Moreover, the fact that the Clause was designed to give important 
protections was recognized by two of the most prominent skeptics of 
giving full content to the Clause.  Justice Robert Jackson recognized 
that “the hope of imparting to American citizenship some of this vi-
tality was the purpose” of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.42  But 
he also admitted that the Supreme Court had failed to allow that 
hope to be realized:  “the hope proclaimed in such generality soon 
shriveled in the process of judicial interpretation.  For nearly three-
quarters of a century this Court rejected every plea to the privileges 
and immunities clause.”43 
Charles Fairman suggested that “Congress, no doubt, meant . . . to 
establish some substantial rights even though the State might not it-
self have established them for its own citizens.  These were the ‘privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the United States.’”44  Writing al-
most ten years later about the Slaughter-House Cases, Fairman 
acknowledged, without regret, that the Court “virtually scratched [the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause] from the Constitution.”45 
 
 40 322 U.S. 46 app. at 92–123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 41 One should be careful to note, however, that Justice Black did not base his dissent upon 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause or the Due Process Clause but made it clear that he 
was relying upon all of Section 1 of the Amendment.  This would include Privileges and 
Immunities, Due Process, and the Citizenship Clause.  Id. at 68, 71–74. 
 42 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 182 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Charles Fairman, What Makes a Great Justice?  Mr. Justice Bradley and the Supreme Court, 1870-
1892, 30 B.U. L. REV. 49, 77 (1950).  Fairman argued that Congress did not make “clear 
what their content should be.  It left that to the Justices when actual cases required an-
swers.”  Id. 
   In contrast, Justice Swayne indicated that with respect to Section 1:  “No searching 
analysis is necessary . . . . Its language is intelligible and direct.  Nothing can be more 
transparent.  Every word employed has an established significance.  There is no room for 
construction.  There is nothing to construe.  Elaboration may obscure, but cannot make 
clearer, the intent and purpose sought to be carried out.”  The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 126 (1873) (Swayne, J., dissenting). 
 45 Fairman, supra note 44, at 78.  For accounts of the flaws in Fairman’s analysis, see Alfred 
Avins, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights:  The Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited, 6 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 1, 3 (1968); Richard L. Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1197 (1995); William W. Crosskey, Charles Fairman, “Leg-
islative History,” and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(1954); BRANDWEIN, supra note 35; Aynes, supra note 14. 
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In 1941 Fairman’s friend, Justice Robert Jackson,46 wrote in Ed-
wards v. California, that the Court “always hesitated to give any real 
meaning to the privileges and immunities clause lest it improvidently 
give too much.”47  Fairman justified the Court’s action in words that 
parallel those of Justice Jackson:  “The words meant too much, or al-
most nothing.  The majority chose the latter alternative.”48  In taking 
this approach, Fairman, Justice Jackson, and the Court ignored well-
known principles of Constitutional interpretation.  As Chief Justice 
Marshall wrote in Marbury v. Madison:  “It cannot be presumed that 
any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect.”49  Fur-
thermore, in interpreting the Constitution, “real effect should be giv-
en to all the words it uses.”50 
It is not without irony that these two prominent and loyal New 
Dealers took a stand against the judicial activism of Lochner51 and later 
cases striking down New Deal legislation, and yet with respect to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, they took the very same approach they had 
 
   As Professor Amar has suggested, Professor Fairman’s “unfair substance and tone put 
almost an entire generation of lawyers, judges, and law professors off track” from an accu-
rate interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  AMAR, supra note 13, at 188 n.*. 
   Though Fairman gained prominence as a scholar, during World War II, while he was 
a political science professor at Stanford, he “defended the constitutionality of the military 
orders excluding Japanese Americans from the West Coast.”  John Q. Barrett, A Com-
mander’s Power, A Civilian’s Reason:  Justice Jackson’s Korematsu Dissent, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 57, 65 (2005).  “Although early commentators on Korematsu praised Justice Jack-
son’s dissent,” Fairman thought Jackson was “‘wrong’ and urged him to reconsider his 
narrow view of executive power in wartime emergency.”  Id. 
 46 Charles Fairman was a Colonel in the Judge Advocate General’s Division in Germany af-
ter World War II.  Fairman was the head of the international law branch at Frankfurt and 
in some way supervised war criminal prosecutions in that theatre.  Though the exact na-
ture of their joint work is unclear, in that position he worked with Justice Robert Jackson 
during the Nuremberg trials.  John Q. Barrett, The Nuremberg Roles of Justice Robert H. Jack-
son, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 511, 522 (2007).  Their relationship was close 
enough that, in 1950, Justice Jackson sent Fairman a long letter asking for his advice on 
pending cases involving racial segregation in education, and he outlined eight questions 
for Fairman’s consideration.  Letter from Robert H. Jackson, Supreme Court Justice, to 
Charles Fairman, Professor of Law, Stanford University (Mar. 13, 1950) in WILLIAM M. 
WIECEK, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION:  THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT, 1941-1953, at 713–15 (2006).  On the relationship between  Justice Frankfurter 
and Charles Fairman, see Aynes, supra note 45.  The article also gives accounts of some 
contacts between Fairman and Justice Jackson. 
 47 314 U.S. 160, 183 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 48 Fairman, supra note 44, at 78.  An interpretation could mean “too little” or “too much” 
only by ignoring the limitations of the text.  Fairman was obviously looking at this from a 
policy standpoint and accepting his choice and the choice of the Court on policy over the 
choices made by the framers and ratifiers of the Constitutional Amendment. 
 49 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). 
 50 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151 (1926). 
 51 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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condemned.  Because they did not like the broad provisions of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, and because they thought they knew 
better than the Fourteenth Amendment framers and ratifiers, they 
believed they were justified in supporting or acquiescing in “scratch-
ing” the words out of the Constitution. 
III.  THE BREADTH OF THE PROTECTION PROVIDED BY THE PRIVILEGE 
OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 
As my colleague Elizabeth Reilly noted in opening a conference 
commemorating the 140th anniversary of the ratification of the 
Amendment, Section 1 contains “stunning opening phrases” that in-
clude “sweeping evocations of individual rights” including the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause.52  Justice Strong, writing for a 7-2 majority 
in Strauder v. West Virginia noted that: 
The Fourteenth Amendment makes no attempt to enumerate the rights 
it designed to protect.  It speaks in general terms, and those are as com-
prehensive as possible.  Its language is prohibitory; but every prohibition 
implies the existence of rights and immunities, prominent among which 
is an immunity from inequality of legal protection, either for life, liberty, 
or property.53 
As an example, consider the statement of Section 1 author Bing-
ham, who indicated that after the privilege of worshipping God in 
one’s own way, the second greatest privilege of a citizen was “to bear 
true faith and allegiance to the Constitution and Government of his 
country, and not to be told by a mere act of State secession that he 
must be dragged into the field and armed to the teeth to strike down 
the world’s last hope.”54  This may seem a little “out of the box” com-
pared to traditional thinking about the Clause.  But the context for 
this was Bingham’s thinking about the 1833 Force Act55 which pro-
vided for federal protection for U.S. government employees who 
might be criminally prosecuted, imprisoned or drafted by rebels, but 
not for ordinary U.S. citizens who owed allegiance to the national 
government.  This example shows the far-ranging, and yet reason-
able, possibilities for the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
Further, one should be aware of the fact that the Framers built in 
duplicate or redundant protections.  As Jacobus tenBroek observed in 
1951:  “The three clauses of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
 52 Elizabeth A. Reilly, Infinite Hope:  Introduction to the Fourteenth Amendment:  the 140th Anni-
versary Symposium, 42 AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
 53 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879). 
 54 Father in Israel, CINCINNATI COM. GAZETTE, Oct. 3, 1885, at 3. 
 55 Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, 4 Stat. 632. 
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are mostly but not entirely duplicative. . . . All three, however, refer to 
the protection or abridgement of natural rights. . . . Section 5 thus 
confirms or effects a revolution in federalism by nationalizing the 
natural or civil rights of men or citizens.”56 
This is not surprising.  Almost every right can be protected both 
directly and by equality concepts.  Further, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment framers who had been in the anti-slavery struggle had seen 
many of their heart-felt beliefs rejected.  Their view of the Fugitive 
Slave Act was struck down in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.57  Their view of the 
Citizenship Clause and Article IV was struck down in the clearly mis-
taken opinion in Dred Scott.58  They saw the white slaveholding south-
ern conspirators orchestrate a great Civil War simply because they 
had lost an election.  The framers thought the Thirteenth Amend-
ment put the issue of race and citizenship behind them, only to see it 
did not.  They thought the Civil Rights Act of 1866 achieved the rest 
of what the Thirteenth Amendment did not do, only to discover that 
resistance continued.  By the time they came to draft and ratify the 
Fourteenth Amendment it was clear that they had good reason to 
build in multiple, redundant protections. 
While judges and law professors often treat each clause of the 
Amendment as if it were separate and independent,59 an examination 
 
 56 JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 239 (1965).  This book was originally published 
in 1951 under the title THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.  See 
also Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 313 (2007) 
(“The purpose of the Citizenship, Privileges or Immunities, and Equal Protection Claus-
es, and indeed of the entire Fourteenth Amendment, was to secure equal citizenship, 
equal civil rights, and civil equality for all citizens of the United States.”). 
 57 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
 58 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 59 A common argument is to observe that the Fifth Amendment contains a due process 
clause and that if the privileges and immunities “incorporate” that clause, then the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is “surplusage.”  CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  POWERS AND LIBERTIES 455 (2d ed. 2005).  But this claim ignores 
the fact that, within the Fourteenth Amendment itself, the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause applies only to citizens and the Due Process Clause applies to all “persons.”  Fur-
ther, it presupposes that the framers had an aversion to redundancy when, in fact, they 
saw it as providing increased security.  Indeed, the Due Process Clause itself was said to be 
a “summary of the whole” of procedural rights.  WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 132–33 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1825).  
Forty-one years later, in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 272, 276–77 (1855), in a unanimous opinion authorized by Justice Benjamin R. 
Curtis, the Court indicated that all the procedural protections of the Constitution were 
contained in the Due Process Clause.  In 1864, Senator Charles Sumner (R-Mass.) said 
that the Due Process Clause:  “Brief as it is, it is in itself a whole bill of rights.”  CONG. 
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1480, col. 3 (1864).  I thank Michael Kent Curtis for calling 
this speech to my attention.  See also, Michael Kent Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment:  Re-
calling What the Court Forgot, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 911, 930 (2008) (“The Due Process Clause 
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of the Congressional debates and other statements by the framers in-
dicates the truth of this portion of tenBroek’s conclusion.  For exam-
ple, in 1862 Congressman Bingham indicated that “[t]he great privi-
lege and immunity of an American citizen . . . is that they [sic] shall 
not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law.”60  Justice Bradley recognized that “[e]quality before the law is 
undoubtedly one of the privileges and immunities of every citizen.”61 
An appropriate application of this view can be seen in a now 
abandoned turn of the century case.  Judge Thomas G. Jones of the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama was 
a former Confederate soldier who had served under Confederate 
General Stonewall Jackson and by the time of Lee’s surrender at Ap-
pomattox was a Major.62  He served as the Democratic Governor of 
Alabama (1890–1894).63  He was appointed to the Court by President 
Theodore Roosevelt.  Yet, his opinion in Ex parte Riggins64 illustrated 
two important features of the Privileges or Immunities clause:  
(i) how the concept of multiple protections for rights worked; and 
(ii) how a generous reading of the Amendment would have provided 
real protection for all citizens. 
The case involved an application for a writ of habeas corpus for 
one Riggins who had been convicted for conspiracy to violate civil 
rights because he participated in seizing a criminal defendant, Ho-
race Maples, from state authorities and hanging him before he could 
be tried pursuant to state law that comported with due process.  
 
should also be read to protect the criminal procedure guarantees of the Bill of Rights for 
all persons.”).  In the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Bradley’s dissent indicates that the Due 
Process Clause included many rights beyond those enumerated in the Bill of Rights:  
“above all, and including almost all the rest, the right of not being deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”  83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 118 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissent-
ing).  Professor Bogen indicates that since Justice Miller and the majority made no com-
ment upon this analysis, it left future courts to pursue and adopt this approach.  David 
Bogen, Rebuilding the Slaughter-House:  The Cases’ Support for Civil Rights, 42 AKRON L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
 60 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1639 (1862).  Bingham also articulated the view that 
due process insured equality.  See AMAR, supra note 13, at 283 (explaining that Bingham 
believed equal protection related to the rights of life, liberty and property). 
 61 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (speaking of 
Article IV privileges and immunities). 
 62 CONCISE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 510 (Joseph G. E. Hopkins ed., 1964). 
 63 Id. 
 64 134 F. 404 (C.C.N.D. Al. 1904).  At the time, Ex Parte Riggins appeared to have been over-
ruled sub silentio by the Supreme Court in Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906).  Nev-
ertheless, Ex parte Riggins was cited by the Supreme Court in Screws v. United States, 325 
U.S. 91, 125 n.22 (1945), and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 70 (1932) (for the proposi-
tion that denying counsel was a denial of due process), and then explicitly overruled in 
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 442–43 n.78 (1968). 
1308 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:5 
 
Though it was argued that there was no Fourteenth Amendment vio-
lation because the state actors were doing all they could to provide 
due process and the murder was the result of the intervention of pri-
vate actors, Judge Jones rejected that analysis.  Judge Jones held that 
when private actors interfere with the State’s attempt to provide due 
process, the private actors can be reached under the federal criminal 
law passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.65 
The syllabus written by Judge Jones indicated that the Thirteenth 
Amendment “prescribe[d], as the standard of the freedom the 
amendment gave” the “perfect equality of civil rights with the white 
race.”66  Further, and importantly for purposes of this article, Judge 
Jones held that “civil equality” was “a right, privilege, or immunity” 
under the Constitution and laws of the United States.67 
The Court held that when private individuals seize a prisoner 
from state custody and murder him in order to prevent the State 
from giving him due process of law, the result is “in the strictest con-
stitutional sense [to] prevent and destroy the citizen’s enjoyment of 
the right, privilege, or immunity to have the state afford him due 
process of law.”68 
In his opinion, Jones specifically stated:  “No one can deny that 
the fourteenth amendment conferred upon the citizen the right, pri-
vilege, or immunity to have his state afford him due process of law on 
accusation of crime against him.”69 
Both Bingham’s Congressional statements and Judge Jones’s opin-
ion in Ex parte Riggins illustrate how the Amendment could be fairly 
interpreted if it had active enforcement by sympathetic judges who 
were supported by the Supreme Court. 
 
 65 134 F. at 423. 
 66 Id. at 404, syll. 1. 
 67 Id.; see also id., syll. 2 (noting that if assailed by white men because of his race and denied 
any civil rights that white men enjoy, then “it is an interference with the [N]egro’s en-
joyment of equality of civil rights” and is an “attack upon [his] right, privilege, or immu-
nity” of freedom given by the Thirteenth Amendment). 
 68 Id. at 404–05, syll. 5.  Jones then distinguished federal authority under equal protection 
and due process.  He found that under equal protection, the federal government could 
exercise only a corrective power to wrongs by the state or her officers.  Id. at 405, syll. 6.  
But as to meeting its duty of providing due process, Jones held that the national govern-
ment had the “power and duty to legislate for the protection of the right, privilege, or 
immunity of the citizen, which the amendment creates, to have the state afford him due 
process.”  Id. 
 69 Id. at 412.  But because this right cannot be vindicated if “lawless outsiders” prevent state 
officers from doing their duty, due process “necessarily carries with it and includes in it 
the right, privilege, or immunity to enjoy freedom, exemption, from lawless assault, which 
supervenes between the state and the performance of its duty.”  Id. at 413. 
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IV.  THE CONSENSUS ON THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 
Though the full extent of the contours of the Clause is subject to 
interpretation, there should be no controversy that, at the core, these 
provisions included the Bill of Rights.70  As summarized by Randy 
Barnett:  “There is now a scholarly consensus that the original mean-
ing of ‘privileges or immunities’ included the Bill of Rights.”71 
There is, of course, some doctrinal confusion.  The Supreme 
Court took an incorrect turn someplace.72  There is debate among 
 
 70 United States v. Mall, 26 F. Cas. 1147, 1147 (C.C.S.D. Al. 1871) (No. 15,712) (holding 
that “the words ‘any right or privilege granted or assured to’ any citizen . . . include the 
rights of peaceably assembling and of free speech”); United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 
81 (C.C.S.D. Al. l871) (No. 15,282) (including the right of freedom of speech and the 
right to peaceably assemble in the privileges and immunities).  There is some question 
about whether these are two cases or a misspelling in Mall.  See Aynes, supra note 14, at 98 
n.262 (discussing the two points of view regarding Mall and Hall). 
   In his decision upon the Circuit in the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Joseph Bradley 
indicated that police regulations cannot interfere with liberty of conscience, or with the 
entire equality of all creeds and religions before the law.  Live-Stock Dealers’ & Butchers’ 
Ass’n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 652 
(C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408).  Nor can they “abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States.”  Id.  Further, in his dissent in the Supreme Court, Bradley spe-
cifically listed trial by jury, free exercise of religious worship, free speech, free press, the 
right of assembly, the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, and due 
process as privileges and immunities.  The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 
118 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting).  This was also the view of the U.S. Attorneys office 
and the lower federal courts.  KACZOROWSKI, supra note 36, at 13–17 (discussing judicial 
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the wake of the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act).  Others have read the scope of the privileges and immunities to go be-
yond the Bill of Rights.  See Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compro-
mise—Section One in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 933, 966–67 
(1984) (“No one [of the framers], however, believed that the Bill of Rights was the only 
source of privileges and immunities.”). 
 71 RANDY E. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  CASES IN CONTEXT 292 (2008).  See also 
MASSEY, supra note 59, at 446–47 (“[M]ost of the substantive guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights have been . . . made applicable to the states,” and “this debate is now over for all 
practical purposes.”). 
 72 A majority of scholars who have looked at this issue carefully seem to be of the opinion 
that the incorrect turn took place in the Slaughter-House Cases.  However, there are prom-
inent scholars who say the incorrect turn took place in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 
542 (1875).  For articulations of this view, see Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorpo-
rationism Straight:  A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643 (2000); 
Robert C. Palmer, The Parameters of Constitutional Reconstruction:  Slaughter-House, Cruik-
shank, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 739. 
   One problem with this view  is that neither Palmer nor anyone else  has  given  any 
satisfactory account of Justice Miller’s silence in Cruikshank.  It may be that the Cruikshank 
silence is consistent with the traditional reading of the Slaughter-House Cases.  Or it may be 
that like Justice Bradley and thousands of others, Justice Miller abandoned his original 
understanding of the Amendment as arguably expressed in the Slaughter-House Cases. 
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scholars between the predominant view that this wrong turn took 
place in the Slaughter House Cases73 in 1873, a minority view that this 
occurred in United States v. Cruikshank74 in 1876, and even those who 
believe that two cases left the issues open and it took place in some 
later case.75  But virtually everyone agrees that the wrong turn took 
place.76 
Between 1873–1949, while some people praised it and other peo-
ple condemned it, virtually everyone writing in the area thought 
Miller’s dicta in the Slaughter-House Cases was incorrect.77  It was Stan-
ford and Harvard Professor Charles Fairman—with Justice Frank-
furter and Justice Jackson later citing Fairman as conclusive authority 
without revealing their personal relationships—who changed all of 
this, and ushered in a new era of Fourteenth Amendment scholarship 
that lasted until the early-mid 1980s.78  After “[b]rooding” over the 
problem, Fairman was “slowly brought [to] the conclusion that Jus-
tice Cardozo’s gloss on the due process clause—what is ‘implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty’—comes as close as one can to catch-
ing the vague aspirations that were hung upon the privileges and 
immunities clause.”79 
 
 73 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
 74 92 U.S. 542 (1875).  For a discussion of this case and the underlying historical context, 
see LANE, supra note 36, at 255–57. 
 75 Other candidates might include Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), and Twining v. 
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
 76 By the “wrong turn” I am referring not to the decision of the Court that the regulatory 
scheme set up in Louisiana was constitutional.  Again, the overwhelming majority of scho-
lars seem to agree that it was.  If anyone has doubt, two recent books powerfully support 
that view:  RONALD M. LABBÉ & JONATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES:  
REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2003), and 
MICHAEL A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS:  SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER AND THE 
SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA (2003).  Rather, it was Miller’s dicta upon 
other portions of the Fourteenth Amendment that was incorrect.  See Richard L. Aynes, 
Constricting the Law of Freedom:  Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-
House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 627 n.4, 628 n.7 (1994) (explaining what the 
Court’s error was in the Slaughter-House Cases). 
 77 Aynes, supra note 76, at 678–86 (collecting examples of both praise and condemnation). 
 78 There were other views, most importantly those of William Crosskey.  For these views, see 
1 WILLIAM WINSLOW. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1953), and Crosskey, supra note 45.  Alfred Avins provided a balanced as-
sessment of the debate; he ultimately came down on the side of Crosskey on this issue.  
See Avins, supra note 45, at 3.  Yet Avins’s work seems to have been widely ignored.  But 
maybe this was because Black was winning the “selective incorporation” battle in the 
Court, and it was not all that important.  For more modern critiques of Fairman’s failure, 
see BRANDWEIN, supra note 35 and Aynes, supra note 45. 
 79 Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?:  The Original 
Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 139 (1949) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 
325 (1937)). 
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For Fairman, this had three virtues.  First, selective incorporation 
accommodated the overwhelming evidence that Fairman encoun-
tered indicating that the Amendment was to protect First Amend-
ment freedoms.80  Second, it allowed the rejection of “federal re-
quirements as to juries” for which Fairman had disdain.81  Third, it 
allowed him to assail Justice Black for having “rebelled” against Palko 
and implicitly defend his mentor, Justice Frankfurter.82 
Ironically, as the Fairman/Frankfurter view of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Bill of Rights gained a tighter and tighter grip 
in the academic world, it lost more and more ground in the world of 
courts and lawyers.  In fact, Adamson is generally considered the last 
victory for Frankfurter,83 even though he remained on the Court for 
another fifteen years.84  Less than two months after Justice Frank-
furter’s death, Justice Black announced the unanimous decision of 
the Court in Pointer v. Texas,85 enforcing the confrontation clause of 
the Sixth Amendment against the States.  Elizabeth Black declared 
victory, writing in her diary that the result of Pointer was to make her 
husband’s Adamson dissent “the law.”86 
Raoul Berger published his controversial Government by Judiciary:  
The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1977, twelve years af-
ter Pointer.  Berger was both a student of Felix Frankfurter’s and a 
classmate of Fairman’s.87  Berger took a harsher view than Fairman, 
claiming that the Court’s decisions on selective incorporation, deseg-
regation, and one person, one vote were all contrary to the original 
intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.88  Though one 
person, one vote, and desegregation were more difficult cases to 
make, Berger seemed to be making progress in convincing people of 
the correctness of his views on the Bill of Rights until Michael Kent 
 
 80 Recalcitrant to the end, Fairman only indicated that “freedom of speech was mentioned 
in the discussion of 1866.”  Id.  Of course if freedom of speech had only been “men-
tioned” Fairman would have ignored it and would have not thought it important enough 
to accommodate through selective incorporation. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Melvin I. Urfosky, Conflict Among the Brethren:  Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas and the 
Clash of Personalities and Philosophies on the United States Supreme Court, 1988 DUKE L.J. 71, 
105 (1988) (“Frankfurter won his last major battle in Adamson v. California . . . .”). 
 84 Aynes, supra note 45, at 1266. 
 85 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
 86 HUGO L. BLACK & ELIZABETH BLACK, MR. JUSTICE AND MRS. BLACK:  THE MEMOIRS OF 
HUGO L. BLACK AND ELIZABETH BLACK 109 (1986). 
 87 Aynes, supra note 45; Fairman, supra note 79. 
 88 RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 1–10, 69–98, 117–33, 351–72 (1977) (discussing slavery, reapportionment, 
segregated schools, and judicial review, respectively). 
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Curtis began to critique Berger’s claims.89  We all owe a tremendous 
debt to Professor Curtis not just for his research, but also for his per-
sistence and professional responses to Berger’s prolific efforts, many 
of which contained ad hominem attacks.90 
The overwhelming number of scholars who have systematically re-
viewed the Congressional Globe and the ratification debates agree that, 
at some point after 1873, the Supreme Court abandoned the public 
understanding as well as the intent of the framers and the ratifiers.  
Both Congressman Bingham and Senator Howard made it clear that 
there were other rights that were considered privileges and immuni-
ties. 
In the Senate, Howard quoted long portions from Justice Wash-
ington’s Circuit opinion in Corfield v. Coryell91 and then stated: 
Such is the character of the privileges and immunities spoken of in the 
second section of the fourth article of the Constitution.  To these privi-
leges and immunities, whatever they may be—for they are not and can-
not be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature—to these should 
be added the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight 
amendments of the Constitution.92 
In 1871 during the debate on legislation to protect people against 
the Ku Klux Klan, Bingham said that “the privileges and immunities 
of citizens of the United States . . . are chiefly defined in the first eight 
amendments to the Constitution of the United States.”93 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause provides a solid textual basis 
for many rights already recognized and some that have never been 
recognized. 
V.  APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES FOR PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES 
Professor Barnett has noted that while there has been much work 
on the Bill of Rights:  “Much less work has been done on whether the 
Clause also embraced other unenumerated rights retained by the 
 
 89 The series of critiques by Professor Curtis, replies by Mr. Berger, and more critiques by 
Professor Curtis appears to have begun in Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a Limi-
tation on State Authority:  A Reply to Professor Berger, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45 (1980). 
 90 Professor Curtis’s works are too numerous to cite, but his books include CURTIS, supra 
note 6, MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”:  
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000); and MICHAEL 
KENT CURTIS ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CONTEXT (2d ed. 2006). 
 91 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). 
 92 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st  Sess. 2765 (1866) (emphasis added). 
 93 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871) (emphasis added). 
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people.”94  Obviously, some of these tasks are more difficult than oth-
ers. 
In spite of his crabbed view of the amendment, Justice Jackson 
provided some sage advice in Edwards:  “I do not ignore or belittle the 
difficulties of what has been characterized by this Court as an ‘almost 
forgotten’ clause.  But the difficulty of the task does not excuse us from 
giving these general and abstract words whatever of specific content 
and concreteness they will bear . . . .”95 
It would appear that all the Justices who have written about this 
question have suggested taking a step-by-step or common law ap-
proach to identifying rights protected under the Privileges and/or 
Immunities Clauses. 
Justice Curtis, one of the most thoughtful members of the Court 
during his service, wrote the Court’s opinion in Conner v. Elliott96 indi-
cating that he would interpret the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of Article IV, Section 2, using a case-by-case approach.97  This same 
approach seems to be endorsed with respect to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause by the majority opin-
ion of Justice Miller in Slaughter-House who, notwithstanding the dicta 
to follow, wrote:  “we may hold ourselves excused from defining the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States which no 
State can abridge, until some case involving those privileges may 
make it necessary to do so.”98 
The same view was adopted by Justice Robert Jackson, who, in Ed-
wards, advocated 
[G]iving these general and abstract words [privileges or immunities] 
whatever of specific content and concreteness they will bear as we mark 
out their application, case by case.  That is the method of the common 
 
 94 BARNETT, supra note 71, at 292. 
 95 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 183 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis add-
ed).  See also Taylor v. Taylor, 440 N.E.2d 823, 823 syll. 1 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981) (“It is an 
abuse of discretion for a court to dispose of issues by concluding that they are too difficult 
to resolve, then leaving the issues undecided.”) 
 96 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591 (1855). 
 97 See id. at 593 (“It is safer . . . to leave [the meaning of the word privileges in the clause] to 
be determined, in each case . . . .”).  On Curtis’s role in the Court’s work on due process 
and Article IV, see STUART STREICHLER, JUSTICE CURTIS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA:  AT THE 
CROSSROADS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 98–118 (2005). 
 98 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78–79.  Further, in discussing whether the Equal Protection Clause 
could be used for any others than African Americans in instances of oppression or denial 
of equal justice by the state courts, Miller expressed skepticism but then stated, “We find 
no such case in the one before us, and do not deem it necessary to go over the argument 
again.”  Id. at 81. 
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law, and it has been the method of this Court with other no less general 
statements in our fundamental law.99 
In attempting to identify reference points from which it could be 
determined what the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens were, 
Justice Bradley began with very general principles and then, as out-
lined below, also made more specific suggestions.  Justice Bradley’s 
dissent in Slaughter-House implies that one way of determining the pri-
vileges or immunities of U.S. citizens would be to look to the English 
common law:  “In this free country, the people of which inherited 
certain traditionary rights and privileges from their ancestors, citizen-
ship means something.”100  Bradley noted that the “people of this 
country brought with them to its shores the rights of Englishmen.”101 
But Bradley went further and wrote that “even if the Constitution 
were silent, the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens, as 
such, would be no less real and no less inviolable than they now 
are.”102  In Bradley’s view, these privileges were conferred upon peo-
ple by “[t]heir very citizenship . . . if they did not possess them be-
fore,” and they included buying, selling, and enjoying property, en-
gaging in any lawful employment and restoring to court for redress of 
injuries “and the like.”103 
A.  Looking to the Constitution:  Its Amendments, Treaties and Statutes 
In his Slaughter-House dissent, Justice Bradley indicated that the 
privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens were “specified in the orig-
inal Constitution, or in the early amendments of it.”104  Justice Miller 
said nothing about the “early” amendments—save for a reference to 
words used in the First Amendment about the right of assembly and 
 
 99 314 U.S. at 183 (Jackson, J., concurring).  To his credit, Justice Jackson noted that there 
were other no less general statements in the Constitution:  “[t]his Court has not been ti-
morous about giving concrete meaning to such obscure and vagrant phrases as ‘due 
process,’ ‘general welfare,’ ‘equal protection,’ or even ‘commerce among the several 
States.’”  Id. 
100 83 U.S. at 114 (Bradley, J., dissenting).  In addition, the first Justice Harlan, whose many 
dissents often eventually became the law, indicated that “[t]he privileges and immunities 
mentioned in the original Amendments, and universally regarded as our heritage of liberty 
from the common law, were thus secured to every citizen of the United States and placed be-
yond assault by any government, Federal or state.”  Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 
122 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
101 83 U.S. at 114 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
102 Id. at 119. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 118. 
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petition105—but he did state in dicta that the rights guaranteed by the 
Thirteenth Amendment, Fifteenth Amendment, and “other clause[s] 
of the fourteenth” were privileges or immunities.106  Justice Miller’s 
and Justice Bradley’s views that privileges and immunities could be 
drawn from the Amendments to the Constitution also demonstrate 
that the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens can be changed by 
new amendments. 
The view that additions can be made to the privileges and immu-
nities of citizens seems to have been held by Justice Miller, the author 
of the majority opinion.  In dicta, Miller wrote that they include “all 
rights secured to our citizens by treaties with foreign nations.”107  
Since new treaties are adopted and old treaties are amended or ter-
minated, this supports the idea that some of the privileges and im-
munities of U.S. citizens will change over time. 
This idea that the amendments and treaties could specify privi-
leges or immunities reinforces Rebecca Zietlow’s108 and William J. 
Rich’s109 analyses indicating that Congress has the ability to create and 
change such rights by statute.  One’s rights as a U.S. citizen should 
include one’s statutory rights, as can be seen by reference to the vari-
ous Enforcement Acts passed by the Reconstruction Congress. 
B.  Civil Rights Act of 1866 
The 1866 Civil Rights Act, and its re-enactment after the adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, are two prominent examples of the 
creation and protection of privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens 
through statutes.  The rights (privileges or immunities) of persons 
and citizens as set forth in the 1866 Civil Rights Act are that all citi-
zens shall: 
 
105 Id. at 79 (majority opinion) (“The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of 
grievances . . . are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.”).  The 
meaning and significance of this statement are matters of interpretation. 
106 Id. at 80. 
107 Id. at 79.  This also indicates that Miller viewed the privileges and immunities as rights.  
For an analysis of international and treaty rights that may be protected through the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause, see David S. Bogen, Mr. Justice Miller’s Clause:  The Privileges or 
Immunities of Citizens of the United States Internationally, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 1051 (2008). 
108 See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement of the Rights of Citizenship, 56 DRAKE L. 
REV. 1015, 1016 (2008) (noting that it was necessary and appropriate for Congress to re-
sort to the Privileges or Immunities Clause to enforce equality rights). 
109 William J. Rich, supra note 12, at 238 (arguing that the “Privileges or Immunities Clause 
authorizes Congress to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amend-
ment when acting to enforce individual rights that Congress has been . . . authorized to 
protect”). 
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[H]ave the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, 
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal prop-
erty. . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like pun-
ishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other.110 
This statute was re-enacted after the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.111  Similar provisions were made under various en-
forcement statutes which protected “any right or privilege granted or 
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States”112 
and “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
of the United States.”113 
VI.  THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE RIGHT IS PROTECTED BY 
PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES 
Although there is consensus that the Bill of Rights should be en-
forced, some express concern that invigorating the Privilege or Im-
munities Clause will supply a pretext for refusing to enforce the Es-
tablishment Clause.  Justice Thomas has expressed discontent with 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause114 and one of our leading scholars 
has suggested that it may be an aspect of federalism, and not an indi-
vidual right.115  But such action would not be supported by a proper 
interpretation of the Clause. 
Many national churches broke apart over the slavery issue when 
prior to the Civil War, Southern slaveholders “seceded” from the 
 
110 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 21 §§ 1981, 
1981A).  An analogous provision was enacted in the Act to Establish a Bureau for the Re-
lief of Freedman and Refugees, ch. 200, § 14, 14 Stat. 173, 176 (1866) (“[R]ight to make 
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, 
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to have full and equal benefit of all 
laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security, and the acquisition, 
enjoyment, and disposition of estate, real and personal, including the constitutional right 
to bear arms . . . .”). 
111 Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140. 
112 Id. at § 6. 
113 Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. 
114 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 677 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I 
agree with the Court that Ohio’s program easily passes muster under our stringent test, 
but, as a matter of first principles, I question whether this test should be applied to the 
States.”); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“I have previously suggested that the Clause’s text and history ‘resis[t] incorporation’ 
against the States. . . . If the Establishment Clause does not restrain the States, then it has 
no application here, where only state action is at issue.”) (alteration in original) (citations 
omitted). 
115 AMAR, supra note 13, at 246–54. 
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churches that preached that slavery was evil.116  They “established” 
churches that were based upon slavery as a divinely imposed institu-
tion.117  The restrictions upon African American ministers both before 
and after the Thirteenth Amendment were designed to control (es-
tablish) the content of religious doctrine presented to parishioners.  
Though there are many references to what might be thought to be 
“intolerance” and suppression of free exercise (freedom of speech 
from the pulpit) in the white slaveholding south, most of these were 
really part of the enforcement of the establishment of the white slave-
holders’ pro-slavery religion.  There is substantial evidence that the 
establishment of religion of the slaveholding south was one of the 
evils the Amendment was designed to address. 
In describing the evolution of nineteenth century views on the Es-
tablishment Clause, Professor Lash notes that there was a marked de-
parture from its Federalist roots “so the principle of nonestablish-
ment was understood to prohibit any government from either 
supporting or suppressing religion as religion.”118  Further, Lash pre-
sents strong support for the view that 
Nascent principles of nonestablishment were trampled upon by the 
southern establishment of pro-slavery Christianity and the suppression of 
“dangerous” religious ideas.  Preventing such suppression of religious be-
 
116 For an account, within the Methodist Church, of Methodist Reconstruction and efforts to 
reclaim Southern Churches and staff them with loyal ministers, see GEORGE R. CROOKS, 
THE LIFE OF BISHOP MATTHEW SIMPSON OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH 253–57, 
262–63 (1891). 
117 Even before the secession of the churches, authorities in Georgia had tried to “establish” 
religion by using their criminal statutes to limit what missionaries among the Cherokee 
Indians could and could not do.  For an overview along these lines, see GERALD N. 
MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE CONSTITUTION:  THE RISE AND FALL OF 
GENERATIONAL REGIMES (2007).  Though challenges are expressed in free exercise and 
freedom of speech language, the Establishment Clause’s relevance is obvious.  In an Au-
gust 10, 1866 speech in Bowerston, Ohio, Bingham indicated that:  “Hereafter the Ameri-
can people can not have peace, if as in the past, States are permitted to take away free-
dom of speech, and to condemn men, as felons, to the penitentiary for teaching their 
fellow men that there is a hereafter, and a reward for those who learn to do well.”  John 
A. Bingham, Speech at Bowerston (Aug. 24, 1866), in CINCINNATI COMMERCIAL, SPEECHES 
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866, IN THE STATES OF OHIO, INDIANA, AND KENTUCKY 19 (1866). 
118 Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause:  The Rise of the Nonestablishment 
Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1089 (1995) [hereinafter Lash, The Rise of the Nonestablish-
ment Principle].  Lash was careful to qualify his work by only arguing that the Establish-
ment Clause was as worthy as any other portion of the Bill of Rights to be enforced 
against the states.  Id. at 1088.  In 1999 Lash suggested that the “fact that southern estab-
lishment of proslavery religion was one of the problems meant to be remedied by the Pri-
vileges or Immunities Clause, at the very least, seems to raise a presumption in favor of es-
tablishment incorporation.”  Kurt T. Lash, Two Movements of a Constitutional Symphony:  
Akhil Reed Amar’s The Bill of Rights, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 485, 495 (1999) [hereinafter 
Lash, Two Movements] (footnote omitted). 
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lief and practice—the hallmark of religious establishments—was cited by 
the architects of Reconstruction as one of the purposes behind the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment.119 
Lash’s work makes it noteworthy that, in the 1866 Congressional 
election, Bingham stated:  “Freedom of conscience is one of the privi-
leges of the citizens of the United States.”120  But Bingham, in that 
same speech, recognized that “[w]e do not ally the church and the 
State.”121 
Thus, properly interpreted, utilization of the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause to enforce the principles of establishment as they ex-
 
119 Lash, The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, supra note 118, at 1089.  Id. at 1138 (“All 
black religious assemblies were carefully monitored to assure the promulgation of only 
pro-slavery Christianity.”).  One technique was to require that ministers to black churches 
be licensed; see also id. at 1137 (“By 1860, the South had erected the most comprehensive 
religious establishment to exist on American soil since Massachusetts Bay.”).  See, e.g., id. 
at 1137 n.234 (quoting an 1833 Alabama statute requiring the license be by “some regular 
body of professing Christians immediately in the neighborhood”).  This license require-
ment was continued in many of the post-emancipation Black Codes.  Kurt T. Lash, The 
Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause:  Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106 (1994).  Though, as the title suggests, Professor Lash’s arti-
cle is clearly focused upon the Free Exercise Clause, the evidence he marshals also dem-
onstrates that the generation that adopted the Fourteenth Amendment had 
establishment concerns as well.  For example, Lash quoted Baptist evangelist Elias Smith, 
active during the “Second Great Awakening” for the proposition that the people were 
“wholly free to examine for ourselves what [was true] . . . without being bound to a cate-
chism, creed, confession of faith, discipline or any rule excepting the scriptures.”  Id. at 
1130 (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).  At the same time, he notes the 
well-known fact that, at least by the 1830s, people held in slavery were prohibited from 
learning to read and from reading the scriptures, id. at 1135, thereby making it impossi-
ble for them to examine for themselves what was true.  Rather, Lash notes that the slave-
holders used “oral instruction,” which was designed to provide those held in slavery only 
what the slaveholder wanted to be known about religion, e.g. “true Christianity.”  Id. at 
1136 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
   Lash notes that after Nat Turner’s revolt in 1831, there emerged “a complex and 
highly regulated system of religious exercise—a system so abhorrent to members of the 
Thirty-ninth Congress that its abolition was explicitly cited as one of the purposes behind 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 1133–34. 
   As Lash explains it:  “[b]lack religious assemblies were heavily regulated with severe 
punishments authorized for improper religious gatherings.  Slaves were not permitted to 
have their own ministers or to worship without the presence of a white man.  Even when a 
religious gathering received the state’s imprimatur, the content of the sermon was dic-
tated by proslavery Christian ideology with the message invariably focused on the biblical 
admonition that slaves ‘obey their masters.’”  Id. at 1134–35 (internal quotation marks 
and footnotes omitted).  See also id. at 1136 n.140 (noting examples of the control of con-
tent of what was preached). 
120 Eloquent Speech of Hon. John A. Bingham, THE CADIZ REPUBLICAN, August 15, 1866, at 2 (re-
ported for Cincinnati Gazette) (reporting Bingham’s speech on his renomination to 
Congress). 
121 Id. 
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isted in 1866 would not alter Establishment Clause jurisprudence to 
any significant degree. 
VII.  SECOND AMENDMENT 
The same principles that enforce the other provisions of the Bill 
of Rights against the States apply to the Second Amendment as well.  
One of the important open issues today is whether the Supreme 
Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,122 recognizing an indi-
vidual’s right to bear arms, should be enforced against the States.  
The advent of Heller brings hope to some and concern to others.  But 
we must follow the evidence where it takes us.  Relying upon Justice 
Scalia’s stated limitations in Heller, I have suggested that the case does 
not really change very much and simply reflects the national consen-
sus on both gun ownership and gun regulation.123 
There are, however, many sources contemporary to the ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment that indicate the framers and ra-
tifiers thought the Amendment supported an individual right to bear 
arms.124  As Professor Amar points out, ironically both abolitionists 
Joel Tiffany and pro-slavery activist Roger Taney reached the same 
conclusion:  “if free blacks were citizens, it would necessarily follow 
that they had a right of private arms bearing.”125  Judge Timothy Farrar 
specifically included the right to “keep and bear arms,” as one of the 
rights protected under Article IV that could not be “infringed by in-
dividuals or States, or even by the government itself.”126 
In his 1868 treatise, in the section where he explained the need 
for the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Dean John N. Po-
meroy posited a situation in which a right protected by the state con-
stitution was not enforced by the state courts.  One example he gives 
 
122 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
123 For this analysis, see Richard L. Aynes, Self-Defense, the 2nd Amendment, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court, AKRON L.:  THE ALUMNI PUBLICATION OF THE U. OF AKRON SCH. OF L., Fall 2008, at 
2, 3, 7, available at http://works.bepress.com/richard_aynes/40. 
124 See AMAR, supra note 13, at 257–66; Maltz, supra note 70, at 966 (suggesting that some 
congressman referred to individual rights, including the right to bear arms, when discuss-
ing the Comity Clause).  Many of the relevant sources are cited in STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, 
FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866–1876 
(1998).  For further support, also see Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Sec-
ond Amendment:  Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309 (1991); Mi-
chael Anthony Lawrence, Second Amendment Incorporation Through the Fourteenth Amendment 
Privileges or Immunities and Due Process Clauses, 72 MO. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
125 AMAR, supra note 13, at 263.  Of course, for Taney this was a “horrible hypothetical” that 
he thought demonstrated African Americans could never be U.S. citizens. 
126 TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 145 
(1867) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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is state legislation in which African Americans “are required to sur-
render their arms, and are forbidden to keep and bear them under 
certain penalties.”127 
Though one could reinterpret Pomeroy’s example into a claim of 
discrimination or denial of equality, read in context it is clear that he 
was addressing the right to bear arms as one of the “first eight 
amendments” that would be “binding with equal force” upon the 
States if the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.128  As Professor 
Akhil Amar has noted: 
[B]etween 1775 and 1866 the poster boy of arms morphed from the 
Concord minuteman to the Carolina freedman.  The Creation motto, in 
effect, was that if arms were outlawed, only the central government would 
have arms.  In Reconstruction a new vision was aborning:  when guns 
were outlawed, only the Klan would have guns.129 
The result was, Professor Amar explained:  “Reconstruction Re-
publicans recast arms bearing as a core civil right . . . . Arms were 
needed . . . to protect one’s individual homestead.  Everyone—even 
nonvoting, nonmilitia-serving women—had a right to a gun for self-
protection.”130 
Thus understood, the analysis which supports recognizing the 
right to have arms for purposes of self-defense is far more compelling 
under the Fourteenth Privileges and Immunities Clause than under 
the Second Amendment itself. 
VIII.  THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
If one looks at the Court’s recent opinions on the writ of habeas 
corpus, its constitutional basis is called into question.  The Court and 
commentators frequently tie its constitutional status to the implica-
tions of Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, commonly called the Suspen-
sion Clause or the Non-suspension Clause.131  Indeed, no matter what 
 
127 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES 150 (1868).  This was probably based upon real ordinances and statutes 
that tried to prevent African Americans from owning weapons.  See AMAR, supra note 13, 
at 264–66 (discussing African American protests against such actions by South Carolina 
and the claim that this violated the Second Amendment in 1865, even before the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
128 POMEROY, supra note 127, at 151. 
129 AMAR, supra note 13, at 266 (emphasis added). 
130 Id. at 258–59. 
131 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2244 (2008) (“[P]rotection for the privilege of ha-
beas corpus was one of the few safeguards of liberty specified in . . . [the] Constitu-
tion. . . . In the system conceived by the Framers the writ had a centrality that must in-
form proper interpretation of the Suspension Clause.”). 
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they say, when one looks at the action of Congress and the Supreme 
Court it often appears that they treat the writ as if it had only a statu-
tory basis which Congress (or the Court) can change at will. 
But the right and the writ are more fully supported by the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause.  In Corfield v. Coryell,132 Justice Bushrod 
Washington indicated that that Art. IV privilege and immunities were, 
in their nature, “fundamental” and included the right “to claim the 
benefit of the writ of habeas corpus.”133  This presents an interpretative 
problem for those who, anachronistically, view the Article IV Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause as guaranteeing only a rough equal pro-
tection or non-discrimination right with respect to State-created 
rights.134 
In the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Miller included “the privilege 
of the writ of habeas corpus” as one of the privileges of the Four-
teenth Amendment.135  Justice Bradley, in his dissent, spoke of the 
“rights of Englishmen” that were brought to the nation’s shores and 
then stated:  “Another of these rights was that of habeas corpus, or the 
right of having any invasion of personal liberty judicially examined 
into, at once, by a competent judicial magistrate.”136 
Bradley also referred to “the right of habeas corpus” as one of the 
rights that, prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, was “only secured, 
in express terms, from invasion by the Federal government,”137 but af-
ter the Amendment was secured against the States. 
During the election of 1866, a virtual referendum on the Four-
teenth Amendment while it was pending, Congressman, former 
Judge and former Union Army Colonel, William Lawrence (R-Ohio) 
indicated that one of the privileges or immunities was the ability to 
claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus.138  A leading treatise 
writer went even further.  Judge Timothy Farrar, one-time partner of 
Daniel Webster, published his Manual of the Constitution of the United 
States in 1867 after the Fourteenth Amendment had been proposed 
 
132 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). 
133 Id. at 552 (emphasis added). 
134 The problem is that if Article IV, Section 2 is only an equality provision, then any State or 
all of the States could choose to not have a writ of habeas corpus and the “right” under 
Article IV claimed by Justice Washington would be illusory.  In reading his opinion, it 
seems clear that he was writing about a substantive, actual right and not a right of mere 
equality or non-discrimination in access to habeas corpus. 
135 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873) (“[T]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, are rights of 
the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.”). 
136 Id. at 114–15 (Bradley,  J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
137 Id. at 118. 
138 CURTIS, supra note 6, at 144 (“Lawrence mentioned the right to . . . claim the benefit of 
the writ of habeas corpus . . . as [one] . . . of the privileges or immunities of citizens.”). 
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but not yet adopted.  In speaking of the Article IV privileges and im-
munities Farrar wrote:  “The right of every person . . . to the ‘writ of 
habeas corpus’ . . . [is] recognized by, and held under, the Constitution 
of the United States, and cannot be infringed by individuals or States, 
or even by the government itself.”139 
This is consistent with the history of the nation and the work of 
the anti-slavery lawyers and abolitionists.  The writ of habeas corpus 
was viewed as a mechanism for maintaining liberty.  Throughout the 
struggles against pro-slavery forces and Slave Power, the writ of ha-
beas corpus was identified with liberty.  It was used to free fugitive 
slaves who obtained freedom in free states, to contest the kidnapping 
of free African Americans by slaveholders, and of individuals wrong-
fully accused of helping slaves to escape.  It is not surprising therefore 
to find that the writ of habeas corpus was deemed available to vindi-
cate the abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude by the Thir-
teenth Amendment.  For example, Chief Justice Chase, sitting as a 
Circuit Judge, in In re Turner struck down Maryland’s use of an ap-
prenticeship program as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment 
through a writ of habeas corpus, even though he cited no jurisdic-
tional statute.140  In the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Miller’s majority 
opinion cited with approval Chief Justice Chase’s action in In re Turn-
er.141 
This was prior to the 1867 Habeas Corpus statute which extended 
the writ to individuals held in state custody.142  Thus, we see a multi-
faceted approach guaranteeing the writ of habeas corpus.143  The writ 
of habeas corpus was secured under Article IV, the Thirteenth 
Amendment, perhaps the Ninth Amendment, and eventually the Pri-
vileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Not on-
ly is this a more secure and text-based formulation, but it would per-
 
139 FARRAR, supra note 126, at 145 (emphasis added). 
140 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247) (concluding that “the thirteenth 
amendment to the constitution of the United States interdicts . . . involuntary servitude,” 
and that “[t]he alleged apprenticeship in the present case is involuntary servitude, within 
the meaning of these words in the amendment”). 
141 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1873) (pointing to Chief Justice Chase’s opinion as illustrating 
the observation that “a personal servitude” is encompassed within the meaning of the 
Thirteenth Amendment). 
142 See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (“[When] in any suit or prosecution which 
has been or may be commenced in any State court, and which the defendant is author-
ized to have removed from said court to the circuit court of the United States, . . . the de-
fendant in any suit shall be in actual custody on process issued by said State court, it shall 
be the duty of the clerk of the said circuit court . . . to issue a writ of habeas corpus cum 
causa . . . .”). 
143 Some might call this redundant.  But redundant protections strengthen each other. 
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haps cause the courts and the Congress to respect the rights of U.S. 
citizens in a way that they do not now do because they view the writ as 
largely a matter of statutes and rules.144 
IX.  THE RIGHT TO FAMILY LIFE 
One of the key evils sought to be remedied by the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments was the failure of the white, slaveholding 
south to recognize marriages and the full range of family rights for 
African-Americans.  Consequently, in looking at the evils against 
which these two Amendments were directed, it would be reasonable 
for courts to conclude that they were protecting the right to be mar-
ried, the right procreation, the right to raise one’s children, and the 
right to have some type of right of family life.145  In many ways, protec-
tion of these rights under the Privileges or Immunities Clause would 
be more textually sound and correct than the use of substantive due 
process. 
An illustration of this can be found in Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land.146  The Supreme Court plurality ultimately decided that Mrs. 
Moore could have her two grandsons live with her, even though they 
were cousins and not brothers and thus violated East Cleveland’s de-
finition of a single family.147  In doing so, it utilized substantive due 
process.148  Efforts were made in that case to claim a First Amendment 
right of association for the family,149 a right of privacy (family auton-
 
144 What appears above is only a sketch of a broader analysis supporting a constitutional basis 
for the writ of habeas corpus that seems to have been set to one side by the Court and the 
Congress.  Hopefully time will allow for a fuller exposition of this view in a later article. 
145 Alexander Tsesis, Interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1337 (2009) 
(“[I]ndividuals’ right to choose a spouse and to raise and educate their children had to 
be secured against state and private interference.”). 
146 431 U.S. 494 (1977).  In the interest of full disclosure, it should be noted that the author, 
then a Legal Intern acting under the Ohio Supreme Court practice rule and under the 
supervision of Attorney Frank Murtaugh, wrote the brief filed in the Eighth District Ohio 
Court of Appeals in 1974. 
147 Id. at 505–06. 
148 See id. at 503–06 (“Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing 
arbitrary lines but rather from careful ‘respect for the teachings of history [and] solid 
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society’. . . . [T]he Constitution protects 
the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in 
this Nation’s history and tradition. . . . [T]he Constitution prevents East Cleveland from 
standardizing its children—and its adults—by forcing all to live in certain narrowly de-
fined family patterns.”) (internal footnotes and citations omitted). 
149 See Brief of Appellant at 21, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, No. 75-6289 (U.S. July 5, 
1976) (“By precluding appellant and her son and grandson from establishing a home to-
gether in East Cleveland, this ordinance unconstitutionally invades the family’s rights of 
privacy and freedom of association.”).  Though many cases were cited, the core concept 
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omy)150 and, utilizing the Ninth Amendment (but not the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause), a right of family life.151  Though the state 
court rejected these claims, the Supreme Court plurality cited many 
of the legal, sociological, and historical sources relied upon to sup-
port the claimed “right of family life,” but chose to rest its decision 
upon substantive due process.  That case and others could more na-
turally be based upon the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Im-
munities Clause. 
X.  CONCLUSION 
This Article follows the path of other scholars in documenting 
that the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens are their “rights.”  It 
points out that some redundant protections are built into the Four-
teenth Amendment and that this is a positive development.  While 
the full contours of the Clause may not be as clear as some would 
like, content may be given to the Clause by looking at natural rights, 
English common law, and rights listed in the Constitution, treaties, 
and federal statutes. 
Examples of the wide-ranging and yet principled possibilities of 
the Clause were illustrated through the statements of Section 1 fra-
mer John Bingham and U.S. District Judge Jones.  The Establishment 
Clause, the Second Amendment, the writ of habeas corpus, and the 
 
relied upon was that “one of the most basic forms of human association in our society is 
the family, and the idea of ‘family’ as the most powerful and intimate center of human 
feeling and trust runs through a long series of familiar constitutional decisions.”  Laur-
ence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term, Foreward:  Toward a Model of Roles in the Due 
Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1973). 
150 See Brief of Appellant at 22, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, No. 75-6289 (U.S. July 5, 
1976) (“The ordinance invades the privacy of family decisions concerning the nurturing 
of children.”). 
151 Id. at 26 (noting that the right to privacy, and therefore family life, partially resides within 
the confines of the Ninth Amendment).  See also id. at 21 (“The fundamental rights to es-
tablish a home, to control the upbringing of children and to family life are established by 
the confluence of several interrelated constitutional doctrines principally within the con-
cepts of freedom of association and the right to privacy.”).  For a historical account which 
provides facts from which one could argue that such a general right exists, see PEGGY 
COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES:  THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES 248 (1997) 
(“To think of family liberty as a guarantee offered in response to slavery’s denials of natal 
connection is to understand it, not only as an end in itself, but as a mechanism of democ-
racy.”).  For a positive account of Cooper’s book, see William D. Rich, Review of Davis, Peg-
gy Cooper, Neglected Stories:  The Constitution and Family Values, H-NET REVIEWS, Apr. 
2000, http://hnet.org/reviews/ showrev.php?id=4032 (praising Davis for succeeding “in 
amassing an impressive amount of historical evidence concerning the centrality of argu-
ments about . . . family life to the struggle against slavery . . . which gave rise to the Four-
teenth Amendment”). 
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right of family life all provide examples of situations in which the Pri-
vileges or Immunities Clause can be applied. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Saenz v. Roe152 held forth the op-
portunity to breathe new life into the Fourteenth Amendment Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause.  That obviously has not happened.  To 
some extent this may be because law is by nature a conservative pro-
fession and the profession is content with the results of due process 
and concerned about what the results may be from utilizing the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause.  But it also has to do with Professor Bar-
nett’s observation that much work remains to be done on developing 
a fuller picture of the options under that Clause.  This article is but a 
small step in that direction.  Further, as far as one can tell, it appears 
that very few cases have been filed asserting claims under the Clause 
and none have been taken to the federal circuit or state appellate 
courts. 
There is some question as to why we should pursue such a path.153  
As I wrote in 1994, even though most results may be the same under 
privilege or immunities and due process, the Court’s current under-
standing of the Privileges or Immunities Clause “distorts our under-
standing of the Constitution to reach a ‘correct’ result through a 
forced reading of the Due Process Clause.  It makes the Court engage 
in a decision-making process it knows is wrong, and, thereby, teaches 
everyone disrespect for the Court and the rule of law.”154 
 
152 526 U.S. 489 (1999).  The case involved claims of the existence of the right to travel, 
which enjoys support in other case law, Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 46 (1867) 
(holding that State taxation of railroad passengers “may totally prevent or seriously bur-
den all transportation of passengers from one part of the country to the other,” though 
not a Fourteenth Amendment case), and in the views of members of Congress as ex-
pressed during proposal and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Maltz, supra 
note 70, at 966–67 (“No one, however, believed that the Bill of Rights was the only source 
of privileges and immunities.  Frequent references were made to the right to travel and to 
the right of access to courts.”) (footnotes omitted).  See also CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 975 (1859) (statement of Rep. Dawes) (discussing what the Constitution guarantees 
“to the citizen of one State when he goes into another”); CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st  
Sess. 1966 (1858) (statement of Sen. Fessenden) (asserting that the Oregon Constitu-
tion’s provision “that no free colored persons shall be permitted to come into the State of 
Oregon. . . . is wrong in its operation upon . . . [his] own State”). 
153 See Bogen, supra note 107, at 1053–54 (suggesting the Court will see no reason to expand 
its interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause because it has accomplished all 
it wants to accomplish through the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses). 
154 Aynes, supra note 45, at 687.  Similar views were expressed in a concurring opinion by 
Justice Robert Jackson, in which he noted that the migration of a person was better pro-
tected under the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause than the 
Commerce Clause.  Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 182 (1941) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring).  He thought that someone who had nothing to sell and no money with which to 
buy anything could not be considered commerce; as he stated:  “To hold that the meas-
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Further, for those concerned with a textual basis for the Court’s 
decisions, rights are often more appropriately protected under the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause than under the concept of substan-
tive due process.  The challenge for today is to restore hope under 
the Fourteenth Amendment by restoring the vitality of the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause.  We are more likely to produce correct deci-
sions by properly using the Privileges or Immunities Clause than we 
are by improperly using the Due Process Clause.  As Susan Gellman 
and Susan Looper-Friedman have noted:  “If you have to drive in a 
Phillips head screw, you can use a flathead screwdriver, if that’s the 
only tool you’ve got.  It may do the job fine.  But if you have a per-
fectly good Phillips head screwdriver in your toolbox, why not use 
that instead?”155 
Moreover, as Professor Lash has suggested, even if judges and law-
yers were “getting it right” in terms of results, “[t]he problem is one 
of political legitimacy.”156 
As Denise Morgan and Rebecca Zietlow have documented,157 great 
strides can be made through the legislative branch.  Furthermore, 
there are many examples of actions of the executive, particularly 
President Lincoln, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Presi-
dent Harry Truman, impacting the protection of the rights of U.S. 
citizens.  Yet we have a tripartite government and in order to opti-
mize protections—even redundant protections—of the rights of U.S. 
citizens, we need the judiciary to fulfill its role as well. 
The one bright example of the judiciary living up to its obligations 
occurred in the era between Brown v. Board of Education158 and Milliken 
v. Bradley.159  First, the Supreme Court responded to the litigation ini-
tiated by lawyers and citizens by chipping away at the edifice of segre-
 
ure of his rights is the commerce clause is likely to result eventually either in distorting 
the commercial law or in denaturing human rights.”  Id. 
155 Susan Gellman & Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal Protection Clause for 
Religion Cases (Not Just the Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 665 (2008). 
156 Lash, Two Movements, supra note 118, at 485. 
157 See Denise C. Morgan & Rebecca E. Zietlow, The New Parity Debate:  Congress and Rights of 
Belonging, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1347, 1350 (2005) (arguing that “Congress has a unique and 
important role to play in providing a nationally uniform baseline of rights of belonging,” 
and “that only Congress can adequately protect those rights”).  See also Zietlow, supra note 
108, at 1015–16 (“[A]t the end of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court greatly lim-
ited Congress’s autonomy to use its power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause and the 
Commerce Clause as a means of enforcing equality rights.  Therefore, it is necessary for 
members of Congress to consider a new source of congressional power to enforce those 
rights.”) (footnotes omitted). 
158 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
159 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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gation.160  Afterward the Court itself seemed to use a sledgehammer 
in knocking down segregation outside of the school context.  In the 
school context, it has been well-documented that the reason the 
Brown decree was able to be implemented was because of courageous 
U.S. District and Circuit Court judges in the South,161 who were fully 
supported by the Supreme Court. 
We can contrast that success between 1954 and 1973 with a lack of 
success in implementing the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and its enforcement acts.  The difference 
was not a lack of courageous judges or the actions of prosecutors in 
the early Fourteenth Amendment cases.  In United States v. Cruik-
shank162 and the Ku Klux Klan trials, we see that there were equally 
courageous judges on the federal bench in the South.  The differ-
ence, one of the failings under Reconstruction, was that the coura-
geous prosecutors, lawyers, and district court judges and even juries, 
had no meaningful support from the Supreme Court of the United 
States.163  Until a majority of the Supreme Court is willing to stand 
behind the clear textual language and public understanding of the 
Amendment we cannot fully meet our obligations under the Consti-
tution.  But the Privileges or Immunities Clause can still be a guiding 
star which the Congress and the President can follow even without 
the aid of the Supreme Court. 
 
160 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:  THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND 
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 710–11 (1976) (explaining that, while the Su-
preme Court’s opinion in Brown “had truly and at long last granted to the black 
man . . . simple justice,” it “mut[ed] the initial response to its decision in the South,” by 
“declining to proclaim a crash deadline for the end of segregation”). 
161 See, e.g., Joel Wm. Friedman, Desegregating the South:  John Minor Wisdom’s Role in Enforcing 
Brown’s Mandate, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2207, 2237 (2004) (discussing the pressures on district 
and circuit court judges implementing segregation and arguing that the Supreme Court 
“has an obligation to lead or at least point out the logical line of development of the 
law”); see also Charles M. Elson, Remembering Judge Elbert P. Tuttle, Sr., 82 CORNELL L. REV. 
15, 17 (1996) (noting that Judge Tuttle “continuously displayed great intellectual courage 
in championing various unpopular causes, both political and social”). 
162 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
163 C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 70–71 (2d ed. 1967) (“The cu-
mulative weakening of resistance to racism was expressed also in a succession of decisions 
by the United States Supreme Court between 1873 and 1898 . . . .”).  Of course, racism 
was not the only cause for the Supreme Court joining the shameful retreat from the 
promise and hope of the Amendment.  For further information in this regard, see 
HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION:  RACE, LABOR, AND 
POLITICS IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR NORTH, 1865–1901 (2001).  For a more traditional ac-
count of factors resulting in the Court’s hesitation to use the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM 
RECONSTRUCTION:  1869–1879 (1979). 
